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ABSTRACT
Home state reluctance to engage in the regulation of international corporate activities in
the human rights context is sometimes expressed as a concern that it would constitute an
imperialistic infringement of host state sovereignty. This concern may be explicit, or it
may be implicit in an expressed desire to avoid conflict with the sovereignty of foreign
states. Yet, in the absence of a multilateral treaty directly addressing business and human
rights, a role for home states in regulating so as to prevent and remedy human rights
harms is increasingly being suggested. The purpose of this paper is to explore theoretical
perspectives that lend support to unilateral home state regulation. Having established that
unilateral home state regulation could serve as a catalyst for international norm creation,
the paper will explore whether, despite its potential benefits, such regulation is inevitably
imperialistic. In order to answer this question, customary international law process will
be critiqued, by drawing upon the work of TWAIL scholars (Third World Approaches to
International Law).

* This paper is a revised and shortened version of Chapter 5 of the author’s PhD dissertation, entitled
Home State Obligations for the Prevention and Remediation of Transnational Harm: Canada, Global
Mining and Local Communities (York University, 2008), written under the supervision of Professor Craig
Scott, Osgoode Hall Law School.

Introduction
The state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, such as
transnational corporations (TNCs), has been identified as one of the fundamental pillars
of a recently proposed framework for addressing the problems of business and human
rights.1 Yet, experts “disagree on whether international law requires home States to help

1

Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human
Rights: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UN HRC, 8th Sess. UN. Doc.
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prevent human rights abuses abroad by corporations based within their territory.”2 There
is greater consensus that home states are not prohibited from regulating TNCs “where a
recognized basis of jurisdiction exists”,3 provided that the home state conduct meets an
“overall reasonableness test, which includes non-intervention in the internal affairs of
other States.”4
Home state reluctance to engage in the regulation of international corporate
activities in the human rights and environment context is sometimes expressed as a
concern that it would constitute an imperialistic infringement of host state sovereignty.5
This imperialism concern may be explicit,6 or it may be implicit in an expression of
concern to avoid conflict with the sovereignty of foreign states.7 Despite these concerns,
and in the absence of a multilateral treaty directly addressing business and human rights,8
a role for home states in regulating so as to prevent and remedy human rights and
environmental harms is increasingly being suggested.9

A/HRC/8/5 (2008) [SRSG Report]. The other two pillars are the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights, and access to remedies.
2
Ibid. at para. 19.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid. See further Sara L. Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global
Mining” (2008) 11 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 1.
5
Imperialism is defined loosely here as the imposition of the desires of powerful states on less powerful
states.
6
See e.g., Austl., Commonwealth, Report on the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 (2001) at paras.
4.47-4.49, online: http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/199902/corp_code/report/report.pdf, rejecting the proposed legislation because it would be viewed overseas as
“arrogant, patronising, paternalistic and racist”.
7
See e.g., Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mining in Developing Countries –
Corporate Social Responsibility: The Government’s Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (October 2005) at 9, stating that the application of Canadian law
extraterritorially could raise several problems, including “conflict with the sovereignty of foreign states;
conflicts where states have legislation that differs from that of Canada; and difficulties with Canadian
officials taking enforcement action in foreign states.”
8
See ibid. at 4-5, noting that the international community is still in the early stages of defining and
measuring corporate social responsibility with regard to human rights, and supporting the work of the
SRSG on this issue.
9
SRSG Report, supra note 1 at para. 19, noting that UN human rights treaty bodies are increasingly
encouraging home states to “take regulatory action to prevent abuse by their companies overseas.”
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The purpose of this paper is to explore theoretical perspectives that lend support
to unilateral home state regulation in the business and human rights context. Part I will
begin by examining two pieces of United States (U.S.) legislation in order to determine
whether unilateral home state action could play an important role as an international
norm creator contributing to the process of customary international law.

The first

example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),10 illustrates how unilateral
regulation can serve as a necessary first step to multilateral agreement on what may in
time come to be an accepted international policy goal. The FCPA was designed to
address the problems of international bribery and corruption associated with U.S. firms
operating abroad. The second example, the Helms-Burton Act (HBA),11 illustrates how
regulation can fail to promote an international policy goal if the structure and content of
the legislation is resisted by other states. While the goal of the HBA was ostensibly to
promote democracy in Cuba, it sought to achieve this goal by penalising foreign
companies while simultaneously providing a benefit to many U.S. domestic firms.
Having established that unilateral home state regulation could serve as a catalyst
for international norm creation contributing to the process of customary international law,
Part I will next explore whether, despite its potential benefits, such regulation is
inevitably imperialistic. In order to answer this question, the process of customary
international law will be critiqued in light of the work of TWAIL (Third World
Approaches to International Law) scholars and the broader claim that international law
itself is imperialistic. This Part will conclude with the observation that one of the central
problems with the claim that unilateral home state regulation could contribute to the
10

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 15 U.S.C. §78dd et seq. [FCPA].
1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L. No. 104114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) [HBA].

11
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development of customary international law, is that as a state-based system, customary
international law silences the voices of local communities impacted by transnational
corporate conduct.
Part II will examine the link between sovereignty, territory and democracy that
informs the international economic system and underpins the international law of
jurisdiction. Drawing again upon the work of TWAIL scholars, this Part will first reveal
that the emerging norm of democratic governance and human rights more generally serve
to give a human face to neo-liberal globalisation without challenging the underlying
structure of the system. This raises the question of whether international law has any
emancipatory potential that could be harnessed in support of host state local
communities.

To answer this question requires delving into the theory of the

international legal form. Here, TWAIL reveals the importance of recognising the agency
of third world social movements in order to write resistance into international law.
Ultimately, this article argues that Susan Marks’ principle of democratic inclusion could
serve as a counter-hegemonic tool for redefining the foundational international law
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference. The legitimacy of home state
regulation will thus depend upon the extent to which it gives voice to host state local
communities.

I. Home State Unilateralism: Imperialism or International
Norm Creator?
A. Unilateral Regulation as Imperialism
Canada’s reluctance to exercise “extraterritorial” jurisdiction as a matter of policy
can be attributed in part to its dislike of the fact that the United States frequently
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exercises jurisdiction over business conduct outside its borders, including Canadian
business conduct.12 This section will examine examples of U.S. regulation that are
ostensibly concerned with addressing harm in other states, with the United States serving
as a legislator of international policy goals. The first example, the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA),13 is often cited as a good model for extraterritorial home state
legislation.14 The second example, the US Helms-Burton Act (HBA),15 has been almost
universally condemned.
The U.S. passed the FCPA in 1977 in an effort to stem international bribery and
corruption by American corporations operating abroad. The FCPA prohibits the payment
or offer of payment or gifts to a foreign official with corrupt intent in order to obtain or
retain business.16

These anti-bribery provisions apply to issuers of U.S. securities,

domestic concerns, and their officers, directors, employees and agents.17 The accounting
provisions of the FCPA require all corporations with securities listed in the U.S. to keep
accurate books and records that fairly reflect transactions, and to maintain an adequate
system of internal accounting controls.18 While the FCPA has never applied directly to

12

Cynthia Day Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era
of Economic Globalization, 2d ed. (The Hague: Matrinus Nijhoff, 2002) at 76-78.
13
FCPA, supra note 10.
14
See e.g. International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human rights and the
developing legal obligations of companies (Switzerland, February 2002) at 153, online:
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107_-_Business_and_Human_Rights__Main_Report.pdf#search='beyond%20voluntarism'; Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin & Penelope
Simons, Deconstructing Engagement: Corporate Self-Regulation in Conflict Zones – Implications for
Human Rights and Canadian Public Policy, (January 2003), University of Toronto Public Law Research
Paper No. 04-07, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=557002.
15
HBA, supra note 11. See also Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. ss. 6001-6010 and related
regulations, e.g. U.S. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515.
16
FCPA, supra note 10 at §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3.
17
Ibid. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2. See H. Lowell Brown, “The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government’s
Campaign Against International Bribery” (1999) 22 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 407 at 417-470,
examining extraterritoriality considerations.
18
The FCPA accounting provisions were enacted as a new Section 13A of the Securities Exchange Act 15
§78m(b)(2). Foreign companies (issuers) that trade securities on U.S. exchanges are thus included.
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foreign subsidiaries, it is structured so as to require U.S. based parent companies to
maintain substantial involvement in the management of foreign subsidiaries or face
liability under the FCPA for the subsidiary’s conduct even while the subsidiary remains
immune from prosecution.19

The FCPA was amended in 1998 in order to more

aggressively address foreign bribery, by asserting jurisdiction over foreign nationals
where a nexus exists between activity within the territory of the United States and the
furtherance of a violation of the statute.20 In addition, U.S. nationals are now prohibited
from committing any act of bribery outside the United States in furtherance of a violation
of the anti-bribery provisions.21
The FCPA was criticised for harming the competitive advantage of U.S. firms.22
As recently as 1997, many European countries not only did not prohibit bribery of
foreign officials, but considered them a legitimate tax deductible business expense.23 Yet
over time anti-bribery legislation has gained global acceptance, gradually being
implemented in both home and host state legislation. While host state anti-bribery laws
have been enforced against home state companies, the difficulties facing host states in

19

H. Lowell Brown, “Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (1998) 50
Baylor L. Rev. 1 at 2.
20
H. Lowell Brown, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?” (2001) 26 N. C. J. Int’l L. & Com.
Reg. 239 at 303 [Brown, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”]. See FCPA, supra note 10 at §78dd-3(a).
21
Brown, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, ibid. at 317. The 1998 amendments were implemented following
the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, infra note 25 in 1997. However, Lowell Brown
criticises them for extending U.S. extraterritorial jurisdictional reach too far. Ibid. at 358-360.
22
Steven R. Salbu, “Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act” (1997) 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229 at 261-271 [Salbu, “Global Market”]. Some scholars have
argued that the FCPA was ineffective at changing the behaviour of American companies. William Woof &
Wesley Cragg, “The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Role of Ethics, Law and Self-Regulation in
Global Markets” in Wesley Cragg, ed., Ethics Codes, Corporations and the Challenge of Globalization
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005) 112. However, Woof & Cragg do not account for the role that the
FCPA almost certainly played in bringing about global consensus on bribery and corruption, which the
authors’ concede provides “a more optimistic view of the future effectiveness of the FCPA”. Woof &
Cragg, ibid. at 143.
23
Brown, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, supra note 20 at 260, n.61.
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addressing corruption problems has made it clear that host state prosecutions alone are
not the solution.24
Significantly, in 1997 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Bribery Convention),
modelled on the FCPA.25 The OECD Bribery Convention, which came into force in
1999, requires state parties to both criminally prohibit bribery of foreign public officials
and to implement greater accounting and internal controls.26 It also requires states to
aggressively assert both territorial and nationality jurisdiction in order to address
international bribery.27 Similar anti-bribery regional agreements were initiated in Europe,
Latin America and Africa in the late 1990s.28 In 2003, the United Nations Convention

24

Open Society Justice Initiative, Legal Remedies for the Resource Curse: A Digest of Experience in Using
Law to Combat Natural Resource Corruption (New York: Open Society Institute, 2006) at 29-30, online:
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2/fs/?file_id=16376 [OSJI Report]; John Hatchard, “Combating
Transnational Crime in Africa: Problems and Perspectives” (2006) 50 J. Afr. L. 145; P.M. Nichols,
“Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation” (1999) 24 Yale J. Int’l L.
257 at 279-283. Global civil society initiatives have also been active in the fight against international
corruption. See e.g., Transparency International, online: http://www.transparency.org/. Multi-stakeholder
initiatives are also increasingly playing a role. See e.g., Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), online: http://eitransparency.org/.
25
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 21 November 1997, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), (entered into
force 15 February 1999) [OECD Bribery Convention]. See OSJI Report, ibid. at 20, 22. For a history of
the U.S. role in the development of the OECD Bribery Convention, see Brown, “Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction”, supra note 20 at 259-268; David A. Gantz, “Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery:
The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus” (1998) 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 457.
26
OSJI Report, ibid. at 24; Brown “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, ibid. at 267-8.
27
Brown, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, ibid. at 268, 278-80. Canada has been criticised for noncompliance with the OECD Bribery Convention as it is the only party not to exert jurisdiction over bribery
offences on the basis of nationality. See OECD, Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, Canada: Phase 2: Follow-up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2
Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, (June 21, 2006) at 5, online:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/6/36984779.pdf.
28
OSJI Report, supra note 24 at 14, 20, 28. See also Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and the New International Norms (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2005).
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Against Corruption (UN Corruption Convention) was adopted, with anti-bribery
measures modeled on the OECD Bribery Convention.29
Some scholars assert that, regardless of international agreement, any
extraterritorial restrictions of bribery are problematic in light of the pluralist cultural
meanings of bribery and gift-giving around the world.30 The wording of the FCPA
prohibits bribery outright, but it also provides an exemption for payments that are lawful
under host state law.31 Accordingly, these scholars claim that the FCPA should be
reworded so that an affirmative statement that the action at issue is allowed is not
required in host state legislation, in light of the fact that most statutes are worded so as to
prohibit violating conduct rather than to affirm permitted conduct.32 An alternate view
would be to consider the current structure of the FCPA as a good example of cooperative
or interactive jurisdiction that puts the onus upon host states to explicitly list culturally
acceptable practices.33

On either view, it is possible to conceive of the FCPA as helping

to enforce the national anticorruption laws of foreign countries in furtherance of
international policy goals. Notably, there appears to have been little if any objection to
the FCPA from host states whose foreign officials have been the recipients of bribes.34

29

United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004) (entered into
force 14 December 2005).
30
See especially Steven R. Salbu, “Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the
Normative Global Village” (1999) 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 223 [Salbu, “Restriction”]; contra Nichols, supra note
22 at 291-303. See also Marie M. Dalton, “Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2006) 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 583; Christopher J. Duncan, “The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?” (2000) 1 Asian Pac. L. &
Pol’y J. 16.
31
FCPA, supra note 11 at §78dd-1(c).
32
Nichols, supra note 24 at 288; Dalton, supra note 30 at 629-631.
33
(This is my view.) In the bribery context this could be justified as the host state officials and elites most
likely in a position to influence the content of the legislation are also the people most likely to benefit from
the bribes. Forcing them to be explicit about what they consider acceptable would provide citizens of the
host state with transparent information about their government.
34
This comment is based upon the surprising observation that academic commentary unfavourable to the
FCPA and in particular commentary that views it as “moral imperialism” does not make any specific
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In contrast to the FCPA, the Helms-Burton Act (HBA) has failed to transform
international norms. Under the precursor statute, the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA),
foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled by U.S. parent companies were prohibited from
trading with Cuba, irrespective of whether or not the trade were lawful under the laws of
the host country.35 The stated aim of the CDA was to achieve international solidarity on
the establishment of democracy in Cuba.36 However, the CDA was denounced by the
United Nations General Assembly as a violation of international law,37 and some of the
United States’ closest trading partners, including Canada, opposed the legislation and
enacted blocking legislation.38
In 1996, Congress passed the HBA with the combined aim of speeding the
replacement of the Castro government with a democratic government, and protecting the
rights of U.S. nationals whose property had been expropriated by the Cuban
government.39

Title III, the “most innovative and most controversial provisions”,40

permits any U.S. national with a claim for property confiscated by Cuba since 1959 to
sue in U.S. courts any natural or legal person who “traffics” in such property.41 Title IV

reference to objections by host states. See e.g. Salbu, “Global Market”, supra note 22 at 282-285. See also
Duncan, supra note 30; Dalton, supra note 30; and Salbu, “Restriction”, supra note 30.
35
Wallace, supra note 10 at 615.
36
Ibid. at 616.
37
Ibid. at 615. The United Nations denunciation took the form of two Cuba-initiated General Assembly
resolutions.
38
Ibid. Indeed, Canada was the first to pass blocking legislation in the form of a 1992 Blocking Order
(SOR/92-584, 1992 Can. Gaz., Pt II, Vol. 26), issued pursuant to the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
(FEMA) R.S.C., c. F-29 (1990).
39
HBA, supra note 13 at §3 (1)-(6), §301(6). See generally William S. Dodge, “The Helms-Burton Act and
Transnational Legal Process” (1997) 20 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 713 [Dodge, “Legal Process”];
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Brice M. Clagett, “The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act”
(Agora), (1996) 90 A.J.I.L. 419; 641. Lowenfeld notes that the structure of some of the Helms-Burton Act
was motivated by Congress’ lack of trust in President Clinton and thus a desire to limit the discretion of the
executive branch.
40
Wallace, supra note 12 at 616.
41
Dodge, “Legal Process”, supra note 39 at 716; HBA, supra note 11 at §302(a). “Trafficking” is defined
broadly to include buying, leasing, managing, using and even “benefiting from” confiscated property, and
the trafficker is liable for the entire amount of the claim and may even be liable for treble damages. Dodge,
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denies entry to the United States to officers and controlling shareholders of foreign
companies that traffic in confiscated property, as well as their spouses and minor
children.42
Predictably, the HBA was resisted by foreign states due to its perceived
extraterritorial reach over foreign subsidiaries of American companies as well as over
totally foreign companies “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”.43 Blocking
legislation was adopted by the European Union (EU) as well as Canada prohibiting
compliance with the HBA.44

The Inter-American Juridical Committee of the

Organization of American States examined the HBA and concluded that it violated
international law.45 The right of action under Title III was ultimately suspended.46
While some scholars believe the HBA demonstrates “the essence of the principle
of territorial sovereignty”,47 states whose nationals were implicated by the legislation
view it as an “unlawful over-extension of jurisdictional reach and thus a breach of …

“Legal Process”, ibid. at 716. Furthermore, the Act of State doctrine is unavailable. August Reinisch,
“Widening the US Embargo Against Cuba Extraterritorially: A Few Public International Law Comments
on the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996”, (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 545 at 549
[Reinisch, “Widening”]; Lowenfeld, supra note 39 at 427-428; HBA, ibid. §302(a)(6). Lowenfeld
attributes the rejection of the Act of State doctrine to Congress’ lack of trust in the judicial branch, and thus
reluctance to let the courts determine the ground rules for the scope of jurisdiction. Lowenfeld, ibid. at
428.
42
Dodge, “Legal Process”, ibid. at 717; HBA, ibid. §401(a).
43
Wallace, supra note 12 at 617. See also Vaughan Lowe, “U.S. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: the HelmsBurton and D’Amato Acts” (1997) 46 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 378-390.
44
Wallace, ibid. at 617-619.
45
Organization of American States: Inter-American Juridical Committee Opinion Examining the U.S.
Helms-Burton Act (Aug. 27, 1996) (1996) 35 I.L.M. 1322. See Dodge, “Legal Process”, supra note 39 at
718.
46
Dodge, “Legal Process”, ibid. at 719. After the EU filed a complaint under the WTO, a formal
agreement was reached exempting EU companies from the HBA. Wallace, supra note 12 at 622-624.
47
Wallace, ibid. at 620 citing Wilkey, “Helms-Burton: Its Fundamental Basis, Validity, and Practical
Effect”, 26 International Law News [American Bar Association] (Spring 1997) at 17; and Giesze, “HelmsBurton in Light of Common Law and Civil Law Legal Traditions: Is Legal Analysis Alone Sufficient to
Settle Controversies Arising under International Law?”, 26 International Law News [American Bar
Association] (Spring 1997) at 17.
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customary international law.”48 A more complete understanding may be that while the
scope of enforcement jurisdiction under the HBA is within territorial limitations, and the
scope of adjudicative jurisdiction has not been enlarged,49 the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction under the statute remains impermissibly extraterritorial as it seeks to regulate
conduct entirely outside the U.S.50 In other words, while the HBA imposes sanctions on
the territory of the U.S. that are likely to be effective, this does not “conceal or erase the
fact that the prescription is extraterritorial, and thus the entire law remains illegal.”51
This analysis presumes that the creation of a private law liability claim enforceable in
U.S. courts is in substance an exercise of the jurisdiction to prescribe, as it represents an
alternative to a public law prohibition against investment in Cuba.52
While Title III of the HBA could be justified under the effects doctrine as the
regulation of conduct with no physical link to U.S. territory that is intended to produce
economic effects within the U.S., this is not convincing due to Cuba’s ongoing
international law obligation to compensate.53 It is also difficult to justify Title III as the
enforcement of an international wrong in the unlawful taking of property from U.S.
citizens, due to the controversial nature of the legal rules governing compensation for

48

Wallace, ibid. at 622. See Christian Franken, “The Helms-Burton Act: Force or Folly of the World’s
Leader”, (1998) 7 Minn. J. Global Trade 157; Lowenfeld & Clagett, supra note 39; Reinisch, “Widening”,
supra note 41.
49
Reinisch, “Widening”, ibid. at 551.
50
Brigitte Stern, “How to Regulate Globalization?” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International
Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
247 at 258, 255-261.
51
Ibid. at 258. Stern states: “The adoption of an extraterritorial rule or decision is not always contrary to
international law, it is only contrary to international law when it does not have a reasonable link with the
State enacting such a rule or making such a decision.” [emphasis in original] Ibid. at 257.
52
Reinisch, “Widening”, supra note 41 at 550-551.
53
Ibid. at 552-553. See further on the effects doctrine in Seck, supra note 4 at 12-13. The effects doctrine
is relied upon to justify jurisdiction over companies with securities listing on U.S. exchanges for the
purposes of the FCPA. See Brown, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, supra note 20 at 330-331. For the
argument that Title III of the HBA is designed to prevent the clouding of title that might make restitution
impossible, see Clagett, supra note 39 at 435.
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expropriation.54 A more plausible interpretation is to view HBA as akin to export control
legislation that is suspect because it is really designed to further U.S. foreign policy.55

B. Unilateralism and the Process of Customary International Law
According to the above analysis, while the exercise of home state jurisdiction may
often be resisted by other states, such legislation can sometimes serve as a precursor to
multilateral agreement furthering international policy goals. As a multilateral agreement
specifically addressing business and human rights is unlikely to be negotiated in the near
future,56 this section will focus on how unilateral home state regulation could further the
process of customary international law formation. An important preliminary point is that
even a state as powerful as the United States cannot create a rule of customary
international law through its unilateral practice alone.

This is because custom is

traditionally understood to require both consistent state practice and opinio juris – the
belief by states that their practice is in accordance with the law.57

54

Reinisch, “Widening”, supra note 41 at 557-558. Accordingly, these cannot be characterised as
constituting a common interest for all states. But see contra Clagett, supra note 39 at 436-438. See also
August Reinisch, “The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors” in
Philip Alston, ed. Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 37 at 5661 [Reinisch, “Changing Framework”]. Reinisch explores the question of whether shared international
interests can justify extraterritorial laws. A further problem with the HBA is that by compensating Cubans
who are now American citizens, it violates the nationality of claims principle of public international law.
Robert L. Muse, “The Nationality of Claims Principle of Public International Law and the Helms-Burton
Act” (1997) 20 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 777-798.
55
Dodge, “Legal Process”, supra note 39 at 720-722; Wallace, supra note 12 at Chapter XII, 589-613.
This accords with Reinisch, who observes that while in the human rights sphere, a common rationale of
defence of shared substantive interests in protecting human rights can be used to justify extraterritorial
legislation, “behind such a model always lurks the danger of an unilateral assessment of what human rights
are, which types of human rights deserve extraterritorial protection, etc.” Reinisch, “Changing Framework,
ibid. at 60.
56
John Ruggie, “Business and human rights – Treaty road not travelled” Ethical Corporation (6 May
2008), online: Ethicalcorporation.com <http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?contentid=5887>.
57
Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
at 130. But see Christiana Ochoa, “The Individual and Customary International Law Formation” (2007) 48
Virg. J. Int’l L. 119, exploring in detail literature, doctrine and practical challenges of including individuals
in the formation of customary international law.

12

According to Michael Byers, the international law principles of jurisdiction,
personality, reciprocity and legitimate expectations qualify the application of power
within the process of customary international law.58 These principles constitute a “firmly
established framework within which other, more precise customary rules may develop,
exist and change”.59 They affect how states may participate in the customary process
“both in terms of how they may apply non-legal power, and in terms of their
effectiveness in doing so.”60 For example, blocking statutes, such as those instituted in
response to U.S. HBA, are “assertions of the power advantage that is conferred by
jurisdiction over territory”.61 Thus, the principle of jurisdiction provides host states with
a territorial advantage that can serve to qualify the application of home state power,
rendering “weak and ineffective” states which, in other contexts, are very powerful.62
Under the personality principle, large numbers of less powerful states behaving in
unison may be able to engage in enough state practice to alter customary rules even if
more powerful states are opposed.63 TNCs, despite being powerful actors with limited
international legal personality, are not entitled to participate fully in the process of
customary international law.64 However, the vehicle of diplomatic protection assimilates
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the rights of individuals and corporations to the rights of their national state.65 As a
result, states with nationals involved in a given area of activity such as foreign investment
(home states) are entitled to “participate in the process of customary international law in a
way, or to an extent, that might otherwise be precluded.”66
The principle of reciprocity provides that any state that claims a right under
international law must accord that same right to all other states.67 A claim that is
inconsistent with international law may quickly lead to changes in custom if the claim
offers an obvious advantage to most states with little associated disadvantage.68 A claim
that by itself or by extension fails to offer any benefit to more than a few states may still
serve to apply pressure in treaty negotiations.69 Thus, reciprocity can explain the success
of the FCPA as a unilateral claim that, while offering no economic benefit to
implementing states like the U.S., served to apply pressure to treaty negotiations and the
development of customary international anti-bribery norms. The HBA could not play a
similar role, as it hurt the economic interests of other states while being designed to
further a policy goal strongly opposed by many states.

However, state practice in

response to the HBA added weight to or clarified existing rules.70
The principle of legitimate expectation is at the heart of customary international
law process because it gives legal significance to patterns of state behaviour.71 Some
customary rules are more resistant to change than others as a result of differing degrees of
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“supporting, ambivalent and opposing State practice”.72 As legitimate expectation is a
measure of what states believe to be the weight of a rule rather than what the weight of a
rule might actually be, situations may exist where states believe that a rule of customary
international law exists when in fact there is no such rule.73 This mistaken belief in a preexisting rule may prevent or retard the development of new rules, as the threshold for the
creation of a new rule may be higher where an old rule exists than where there is no such
pre-existing rule.74 The principle of legitimate expectation may be at play in home state
perceptions of the illegitimacy of extraterritorial regulation in the human rights and
environment context.
The significance of conduct that furthers international policy goals is also
addressed by Byers. From the international relations perspective, the customary process
can be understood as a regime or institution which determines the common interests of
most if not all states, then “protects and promotes those common interests with rules.”75
While the interests of states would usually become clear only after weighing “relative
amounts of supporting as compared to ambivalent or opposing state practice”, in some
contexts, such as human rights, the interests of states may be so conspicuous as to not
require a careful examination of state practice.76 In these cases, less supporting practice
may be necessary for rules to develop, continue or change.77
In conclusion, then, the Byers analysis confirms that, depending upon its
structure, unilateral home state regulation could play a significant role in the development
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of customary international law. Despite this, it is difficult to convince home states to act
as regulators of international corporate conduct due to their mistaken belief that this type
of regulatory action is impermissible.

Scholars also disagree as to the merits of

unilateralism,78 with some arguing that unilateralism threatens the entire international
system by undermining the general obligation of cooperation that is a basic principle of
the U.N. Charter.79 However, a better interpretation may be that states are under an
obligation to first exhaust opportunities for international negotiation and cooperation
before choosing to implement unilateral measures.80
Notably, Third World scholars like B.S. Chimni have critiqued the exercise of
unilateral extraterritorial jurisdiction by advanced capitalist states, even after satisfying a
criterion of good faith dialogue with other states.81

Chimni is critical of U.S.

unilateralism through both certification mechanisms and “substantivism” by U.S. courts
that choose to apply the “better law” in economic conflicts.82

According to Chimni,

such unilateralism cannot be justified on the basis of a reasonable link with the state
enacting the rule or making the decision, because “in the era of globalization a
78
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‘reasonable link’ is not always difficult to establish for imperial states, especially when it
is backed by power.”83 However, he is equally critical of the denial of what he calls
“justice jurisdiction” by advanced capitalist state courts in the context of mass torts
committed by TNCs in third world states.84 This suggests that more attention must be
given to imperialism concerns associated with home state unilateralism, but from the
perspective of the Third World.

C. Imperialism, International Law, and Local Communities
According to Antony Anghie, international legal doctrines, including the
sovereignty doctrine, were formulated as part of the colonial encounter.85

A “dynamic

of difference” is evident in the very beginning of the discipline of international law, and
“precedes, even generates, the concepts and dichotomies – for example, between public
and private, between sovereign and non-sovereign – which are traditionally seen as the
foundations of the international legal order.”86

This dynamic of difference and the

accompanying “civilizing mission” have been reproduced throughout the history of
international law and continue to play a decisive role in contemporary international
relations through divisions between “developed and developing, the pre-modern and the
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post-modern”.87 Indeed, Anghie argues that the basic structures of colonialism are
“reproduced in all the major schools of international jurisprudence.”88
Anghie traces this dynamic of difference from the writings of the sixteenth
century Spanish jurist Vitoria through the work of positivist jurists in the nineteenth
century to the Mandate System of the League of Nations.89 The Mandate System was
established in opposition to the type of colonialism practiced in the nineteenth century,
ostensibly serving to transform colonial territories into the sovereign states essential for
international law’s claim to universality, yet, in practice, the Mandate System transferred
“only sovereignty to mandate peoples, not the powers associated with ‘government’ in
the form of control over the political economy”.90 Cultural difference was transformed
from the distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized into the distinction between
the economically backward and the economically advanced, replacing nineteenth century
racist vocabulary with concepts that give the illusion of neutrality.91 The management
technologies of the international law and international institutions of the Mandate System
put in motion relations of domination, “relations that almost render irrelevant the formal
sovereignty for which these societies ostensibly were being prepared”.92
According to Anghie, the practices of powerful Western states in the period
following the establishment of the United Nations and continuing today may be best
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understood as the “continuation, consolidation and elaboration of imperialism.”93 In
strictly legal terms, the Mandate System was succeeded by the Trusteeship System of the
United Nations. Yet, for Anghie, the management technologies of the Mandate System
were succeeded by the Bretton Woods Institutions of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, universalised to apply to all developing states under
theories of modernisation.94
Thus, Third World sovereignty today is not the sovereign equality of the First
World or that posited as a foundational principle of international law, but rather an
impoverished sovereignty in which Third World states continue to be denied the ability to
govern in the economic realm. This suggests that any claim that Third World sovereignty
will be infringed by First World home state regulation is suspect to the extent that it
denies the ongoing history of infringement that dates from the colonial encounter to the
neo-colonialism of today’s economic order. This includes not only the policies of the
Bretton Woods institutions, but also those of home state institutions that engage in Third
World economic development. Anghie notes that, if he is correct that “an understanding
of the distinctive character of non-European sovereignty can support a claim that all
states are not equally sovereign and that this is because of international law and
institutions rather than despite international law and institutions”, then “it may become
important to reassess the relationship between international law and Third World
sovereignty.95
Anghie examines the post-colonial efforts of newly sovereign Third World states
to construct an anti-colonial international law by attempting to revise old doctrines that
93
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they had played no role in formulating.96

For example, the elaboration of a new

“transnational law of international contracts”97 by the West expanded the power of TNCs
by granting them the necessary international legal personality to pursue claims in the
international realm.98 The result was that while Third World states asserted the primacy
of their national laws over TNCs operating within their territory, an “incontrovertible and
classic principle” of sovereignty and jurisdiction,99 concession agreements were instead
characterised both as a “quasi-treaty between a sovereign and a quasi-sovereign” and as a
“contract between two private parties”.100 Under either characterisation, there was a “real
reduction in the powers of the sovereign Third World state with respect to the Western
corporation.”101
If Anghie’s analysis is applied to Byers’ framework principles, then the principle
of personality reveals the imperialism of international law by extending home state and
thus corporate power through the diplomatic protection doctrine of espousal of claims,
weakening Third World power. The concept of international legal personality has been
identified by many scholars as in need of rethinking, often as part of a larger project
seeking to make international law more democratic.102 Anghie’s work suggests that
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increased recognition of non-state actors, whether TNCs or NGOs, as participants in
international law-making processes must be carefully scrutinised to ensure that this does
not contribute to the further undermining of Third World sovereignty.103
Byers’ three other principles also appear less convincing in light of Anghie’s
work. While the power advantage of territorial jurisdiction is undeniable, Third World
states may be less able to exercise this power in the face of pressures from international
institutions that restrict Third World economic sovereignty.

Reciprocity similarly

presumes equality among states, yet diminished Third World sovereignty may deny Third
World states’ equal participation in the customary process. The principle of legitimate
expectations presumes that those who engage in the process of customary international
law speak a common language, yet the language is one of a western-educated elite.
While Byers does not address concerns about imperialism in customary
international legal process, he does note that his analysis is problematic in that it assumes
states are the only actors on the international stage.104 Questioning the state-centric
nature of international law brings to light the exclusion of local community perspectives
from customary international legal process, of significance to the analysis of home state
regulation in many contexts, including for example that of global mining.105 According
to Anghie, the relationship between the state and minorities as characterised by
international law reproduces the dynamic of difference, with the minority as the primitive
that “must be managed and controlled in the interests of preserving the modern and
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universal state.”106 This suggests that state-based processes like customary international
law are particularly problematic when the issues at hand are those that directly impact
disempowered local communities within the state, whether rich or poor. The law of selfdetermination has developed to recognise that indigenous and minority communities have
interests that diverge from that of the nation-state to which they are attached. However,
self-determination in its classic decolonisation context presumes that those engaged in
resistance seek to become states themselves, rather than acknowledging that other goals
may be more important than the achievement of state sovereignty.107
The work of Balakrishnan Rajagopal on international law, third world resistance
and social movements takes the analysis further.

Rajagopal’s claims that dominant

approaches to international law are deficient because they ignore both the fact that the
development discourse is centrally important for the “very formation of international law
and institutions”, and the fact that social movements play an important role in the
evolution of international law.108 Rajagopal argues that mainstream international law
functions “within specific paradigms of western modernity and rationality that
predetermine the actors for whom international law exists”.109 These actors include
political, economic, and cultural actors such as state officials, corporations and the
“atomized individual who is the subject of rights” who interact in privileged institutional

106

Anghie, supra note 85 at 205-207. He continues: “These were the interests that were subordinated by
the Third World state to assert and consolidate itself.” Ibid. at 207. See further Partha Chatterjee, The
Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994).
107
Rajagopal, From Below, supra note 85 at 11. In the global mining context, this is illustrated by the
emergence of the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), yet FPIC continues to be
marginalised as at most an expression of soft law due to the state-centric nature of international law. See
further Seck, supra note 4.
108
Rajagopal, From Below, ibid. at 1.
109
Ibid. at 2.

22

spaces.110 At the same time, international law ignores the non-institutional spaces where
most people in the Third World live and interact.111 As international law in both its
statist realist version and its cosmopolitan liberal version do not provide a visible
framework for considering these perspectives, a fundamental rethinking of international
law is required.112 Critically, there is a need to displace development as a “progressive
Third World narrative” due to its contribution to the nation-building project, in light of:
“the realization among social movements and progressive intellectuals that it is
not the lack of development that caused poverty, inflicted violence, and engaged
in destruction of nature and livelihoods; rather it is the very process of bringing
development that has caused them in the first place.”113
This observation suggests that if First World engagement in Third World development is
acknowledged as the real starting point, home state concern to avoid infringement of host
state sovereignty is revealed as an excuse – or worse – a denial of responsibility.114

D. Conclusions
This Part began by asking whether unilateral home state regulation could serve as
an international norm creator by contributing to the process of customary international
law. The history of the FCPA revealed that this was indeed possible. By contrast, the
history of the HBA revealed that unilateral regulation, even by a state as powerful as the
United States, does not always lead to a change in customary international norms. The
subsequent TWAIL analysis illuminated a key problem with proposing that home state
110
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unilateral regulation in the human rights and environmental context is a good idea
because it could contribute to the formation of customary international law: this
underscores the imperialistic nature of international law itself.

International law is

imperialistic in two different ways. First, the power of developed states may render
formal interstate law processes unequal in practice. Second, due to the state-based nature
of international law, the elites in both developed and developing states can ignore the
realities of communities within the state. While state power can, and often is, tamed by
the nature of the process of custom formation, the fact remains that customary
international law, as a state-based process, renders silent the voices of local communities.
The challenge, then, is to take up Rajagopal’s call to “write resistance into international
law” by making international law recognise the voices of the subaltern.115

II. Sovereignty, Territory and Democracy
A. Imperialism and the Norm of Democratic Governance
According to Saskia Sassen, despite corporate practices of geographic dispersal
that disproportionately concentrate centralised top-level control in national territories of
highly developed countries, sovereignty and territory remain key features of the
international system.116 However, this reconfiguration of the “intersection of territoriality
and sovereignty” does have “profoundly disturbing” repercussions for distributive justice
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and equity.117

Sassen concludes that there may be a “countervailing power to the

ascendance of global financial markets” in the emergence of a new trend in international
legal discourse which “conditions the international status of the state on the particular
political rights central to classical liberal democracy”.118 Thus, “democratic government
becomes a criterion for recognition of the state, for protection of its territorial
sovereignty, or for its full participation in the relations among states.”119
The norm of democratic government has indeed become a mantra of international
law and global governance.120 However, Third World scholars consider it suspect in light
of the neo-liberal agenda of economic globalisation.121 For example, Anghie claims that
neo-liberal economic policies were forcefully advanced in the 1990s by the international
economic institutions of the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and accompanied by “good governance” initiatives in the
form of specific programs designed to promote “democratic” and “legitimate”
governance.122 As a result, the view is now commonplace that “a lack of development
may be attributed to the absence of ‘good governance’.”123 For Anghie, the “good
governance” project “merely replicates the ‘civilizing mission’ that has been such a
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prominent feature of the international relations system”, despite the fact that it claims to
be a new initiative “intimately connected with the emergence of international human
rights law.”124 While the World Bank, indifferent to human rights in the past, has now
assimilated human rights into development by linking governance, development and
human rights,125 these efforts continue to focus on the reform of the backward developing
country, as opposed to recognising the need to reform the fundamental structures of the
international economy itself.126 Thus, the “powerful discourse of human rights” has been
used through the “rhetoric of governance” to advance the interests of the West.127
Similarly, Rajagopal claims that democratisation has replaced modernisation as
the key theme dominating both the political and legal landscape of the post-Cold War
era.128 Development, peace and democracy have been linked in a “holy trinity” that have
had a “defining impact on the production and reproduction of social reality in the Third
World.”129 As a “culture of democracy” is seen as fostering a “culture of development”,
technical assistance once provided only in the context of economic and social
development is now available for democratisation.130

While the “rhetoric of

participation, empowerment, human rights, and democracy” are considered “essential
aspects of supposedly authentic “development””,131 the possibility that “after full
“participation”, the people may prefer the “traditional” over the “modern” is “not
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entertained”.132 The discourse of democracy is interpreted mostly in human rights terms,
and serves as the sole “‘approved’ discourse of liberation and resistance”.133
Rajagopal argues that the proliferation of international institutional actors
engaged in the promotion of democracy has emerged as a consequence of the emergence
of mass democratic movements in the Third World.134

Rajagopal’s thesis is that

international law and institutions “renew and grow more” as “social movements resist
more”, and this “resistance-renewal” is a “central aspect of ‘modern’ international
law”.135 However, the power to “select the voices that constitute “legitimate” democratic
ones in the Third World” has the effect of both “containing and de-radicalizing mass
resistance in the Third World.”136 In essence, Rajagopal charts how the resistance of the
less powerful can be, and is, appropriated by the powerful, including by being
reformulated into updated modes of dominance.
Rajagopal and Anghie demonstrate in different ways that the emerging norm of
democratic governance, and indeed human rights generally, may be viewed as mass
resistance feeding international law and institutions with a new agenda that, while giving
a human face to neo-liberal globalisation, does not challenge the underlying structure of
the system. This raises the question of whether there is an emancipatory potential within
international law.
132
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B. The Emancipatory Potential of International Law
One of the most pessimistic international law scholars today is Marxist theorist
China Miéville.137

Drawing upon the work of Bolshevik legal theorist Evgenii

Pashukanis, Miéville locates the legal form in the economic relationship of commodity
exchange, “rather than in the superstructure of political power”.138

According to

Miéville, the commodity-form theory of law as well as mainstream international law
since Grotius have conceptualised the relationship between sovereign states in the same
way that relationships between private property owners are envisioned.139 Sovereign
equality, a foundational if not definitional concept to modern international law, involves
recognition that each power has the right internally to decide its own policies, and is thus
a theory of formal independence, not substantive legal equality.140 For Miéville, coercive
violence is central to the commodity exchange relationship between individuals and thus
the private law of property and contract. Accordingly, coercive violence is also central to
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the relationship between states under international law, as the state that has coercive
violence to use to back up its interpretation of international law prevails.141
Miéville distinguishes the commodity form theory of law from mainstream
theories of international law that treat disputes moderated by coercion as “pathological to
law” rather than as “inextricable elements of the legal fabric”.142 For Miéville, the social
content of international law is found in the struggle among capitalist states for
domination over the rest of the world in order to provide resources for capital.143 Indeed,
imperialism “outlasts the transition to universalized juridical sovereignty … not because
postcolonial sovereignty is incomplete”, but because “the power dynamics of political
imperialism are embedded within the very juridical equality of sovereignty.”144 Miéville
concludes that he sees “no prospect of any systematic progressive political project or
emancipatory dynamic coming out of international law”, as “the very social problems
which liberal-cosmopolitan writers want to end are the result of the international system,
which is the international legal system.”145 Indeed, any attempts to “reform law can only
ever tinker with the surface of institutions”146 as a world that is “structured around
international law cannot but be one of imperialist violence”.147
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Some TWAIL scholars, like B. S. Chimni, have been drawn to a Marxist theory of
international law.148 However, Chimni also critiques those who condemn international
law for failing to recognise that “contemporary international law offers a protective
shield, however fragile, to the less powerful states in the international system”.149
Moreover, offering a critique without a construction “amounts to an empty gesture” when
compared to seeking imaginative solutions that exploit the contradictions of the
international system.150
Miéville’s theory of the international legal form is contested. For example, many
feminist international legal theorists are critical of the way in which theories of private
property, autonomy and state sovereignty guide the understanding of the relationship
between states and thus international legal form.151 According to Karen Knop, two
theories about states and individuals are prevalent in international legal theory.152 The
first is the analogy that states are like individuals.153 The second is a theory about the
ultimate bearer of rights, thus states are composed of individuals.154 Feminist versions of
the first theory “see the self as connected to others through a web of relationships, instead
of separate and surrounded by solid boundaries that protect autonomy.”155 Depending on
the version of the analogy adopted, feminists would either prefer to see the state
148
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conceptualised as surrounded by permeable boundaries, or by no boundaries at all.156
However, while criticising the premise that the state is bounded, this analogy does not
question the premise that the state is unified.157 The weakness of the analogy theory is
that even its feminist versions do not account for dissimilarities between states and
individuals, as states are neither “unified beings”, nor “irreducible units of analysis.”158
The analogy thus “renders problematic any consideration of the status of individuals and
groups in international law, other than as part of a monolithic state.”159
As the state encompasses a variety of groups and performs a variety of functions
which do not necessarily serve the interests of all groups, Knop notes that international
law has given peoples the rights of self-determination, most often realised as statehood.
Meanwhile, international human rights law takes into account the interests of different
groups through a limited notion of minority rights within the state.160

Yet these

developments create a new problem for sovereignty by raising the question of what
sovereignty should be, and why there should be a single sovereign as opposed to
“overlapping sovereignties, fragmented sovereignties, [and/or] layered sovereignties”.161
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Miéville’s assumption that force ultimately decides both the form and content of
international legal doctrine is also contested.162 Moreover, it is inconsistent with Byers’
analysis of customary international legal process for Byers establishes that the “power of
rules” sometimes affects the behaviour of even the most powerful states, and what these
states “are able to accomplish, when they seek to develop, maintain or change rules of
customary international law.”163

Having said this, Byers concludes that one of the

consequences of adopting an interdisciplinary approach to customary international law is
that it “undermines the ‘realist’ assumptions” adopted as analytical aids,164 such as the
statist character of the international legal system.165
Miéville also identifies the problematic nature of state-centric international law,
as for Miéville, “every international legal decision represents the triumph of (at least) one
national ruling class – it is they after all who have had recourse to the legal form – rather
than of any exploited classes or oppressed groups at all.”166

The importance of

“exploited classes or oppressed groups” is also highlighted by Chimni, who notes that for
a critique of dominant ideology to safeguard the interests of Third World peoples, it must
go hand in hand with a theory of resistance that “avoids the pitfalls of liberal optimism on
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the one hand, and left wing pessimism on the other.”167 Chimni concludes that a third
view is possible which neither assumes that humankind is moving inevitably toward a
just world order, nor that resistance to domination is an “empty historical act”.168 Key to
a theory of resistance is the recognition of the agency of third world social movements.169
Rajagopal explicitly advocates the need to recognise the agency of third world
social movements as part of the project of writing resistance into international law. He
claims that the “bureaucratization of democratic resistance” has been “actively resisted
through counter-hegemonic coalitions in the Third World that he describes as a “new
cosmopolitanism” of “selective anti-internationalism”.170 This new cosmopolitanism is
“highly critical of the economic and institutional dimensions of the international project”,
yet is “supportive of the political and emancipatory ideals inherent in its liberal
tendencies”.171 It differs from old cosmopolitanism in “preferring local democracy and
decentralization-based strategies rather than rights-based ones”.172

According to

Rajagopal, the Third World’s reliance upon traditional sources of cosmopolitan
discourses in international law, in particular the discourses of human rights and
development, needs to be seriously rethought to ensure that they are not used to reinforce
the “existing imperial tendencies in world politics” and thus hegemonic international
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law.173 However, rather than dismissing human rights, he proposes that this calls for a
“search for the radical democratic potential in human rights that can be appreciated only
by paying attention to the pluriverse of human rights, enacted in many counterhegemonic cognitive frames.”174

Similarly, rather than dismissing the discourse of

development, Rajagopal argues that its “radical democratic possibilities” could
“strengthen a new global politics that leads to a reformulation of existing international
law along cosmopolitan lines.”175

Counter-hegemonic power may thus encompass

various tools of resistance, including the use of international law, although international
law is only a “small (though important) part” of counter-hegemonic power today.176
Rajagopal links human rights theory with the colonial origins of the doctrine of
sovereignty, as the state is given a predominant role as the source and implementer of the
normative framework.

Thus, despite its “nominal anti-sovereignty posture”, human

rights remains a “state-centred” discourse, and protest or resistance movements inside
societies are ignored,177 while private forms of violence committed in the name of
development remain invisible to human rights discourse.178 Rajagopal proposes that
international law needs to “decenter itself from the unitary conception of the political
sphere on which it is based, which takes the state or the individual as the principal
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political actor”.179 He argues that the liberal theory of international politics is challenged
by social movements that adopt a cultural politics that seeks “alternative visions of
modernity and development by emphasizing rights to identity, territory, and
autonomy”.180 Moreover, engaging with the theory and practice of social movements
reveals much social movement resistance that human rights discourse is unable to see due
to its state-centred, elitist nature.181 Alternative conceptions of property are offered by
social movements that emphasize the autonomy of communities, thus challenging the
“nexus between property and sovereignty in law by showing how to realise autonomy
without being imprisoned by the language of sovereignty.”182 According to Rajagopal,
civil society must be reconceived as “subaltern counterpublics” in order to reinvigorate
democracy, necessary due to the “NGOization” of civil society that has rendered many
social movements invisible.183

Finally, Rajagopal suggests that social movements

contradict the claims that globalization leads to a reduction in importance of the local, as,
“paradoxically, globalization has led to more, not less, emphasis on the local, but also
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resistance to globalization manifests itself extraterritorially through globalization
itself.”184
Thus, the emancipatory potential of international law is not self-evident, but may
be uncovered by carefully scrutinising the discourses of development and human rights to
reveal their potential as tools of counter-hegemonic subaltern resistance.

The

implications of this observation for the imperial tendencies of unilateral home state
regulation will be revealed through an examination of the work of Susan Marks.

C. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Principle of Democratic
Inclusion
The risk of neo-imperialism associated with the emerging norm of democratic
governance has been the subject of analysis by Susan Marks, drawing upon David Held’s
work on cosmopolitan democracy.185 Marks seeks to rethink, rather than renounce the
project of democratic governance, and highlights the problematic nature of the ideology
of pan-national democracy, or the assumption that global democracy can be built through
the accumulation of national democracies.186 She notes that the conventional approach to
democratic theory is to view the nation-state as a site of democracy with state boundaries
as its limit. Under this conception, the people or demos are conceived as the nation, and
legitimacy is defined in terms of consent by and accountability to the national
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citizenry.187

Underpinning this view is an assumption that “democratic polities are

territorially bounded communities.”188 Accordingly:
“a symmetrical or congruent relationship has been presumed to exist between
those experiencing outcomes and those taking decisions. This relationship has
been held to exist above all between national electorates and their elected
representatives, and between those subject to national jurisdiction and national
authorities.”189
However, the challenge of globalisation suggests that the “nation-state cannot remain
democracy’s container”190 and consideration must be given to the democratisation of
global governance. This implies that “decision-making with global or transboundary
impact – whether undertaken by governments … multinational corporations, or other
actors – must be brought within the scope of democratic concern.”191
Marks cites Held’s use of the term cosmopolitan to “indicate a model of political
organization in which citizens, wherever they are located in the world, have voice, input
and political representation in international affairs, in parallel with and independently of
their own governments.”192 A central claim of Held is that “if democracy is to flourish in
conditions of intensifying global interconnectedness, it must become a transnational
affair, linked to an expanding framework of democratic institutions and procedures.”193
However, this does not mean that democracy should become tied to the international
arena, or that the local and national arenas are insignificant.194 Instead, the “notion of a
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democratic political community should be untied from the whole ‘idea of locality and
place’.”195
Marks critiques proponents of the democratic norm who conceive of democratic
global governance in pan-national terms as the universalising of national democracy,
rather than adopting the cosmopolitan vision.196

The aim of her project is to see

democratic ideas as providing a “framework for emancipatory claims”, with the central
question being how to redirect the norm of democratic governance to emancipatory
ends.197 Accordingly, Marks proposes that a principle of democratic inclusion serve to
guide the elaboration, application and invocation of international law.198 She is very
clear that what she is proposing is a principle, not a right to a right.199 Furthermore, while
it is a new principle, Marks sees it as a principle that can be used to reinforce existing
trends in international law.200

Ultimately, Marks proposes that the principle of

democratic inclusion “might serve to reshape such established international legal norms
as the principle of sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-interference in
domestic affairs.”201 She defines the principle of democratic inclusion as:
195
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“the notion that democratic politics is less a matter of forms and events than an
affair of relationships and processes, an open-ended and continually recontextualized agenda of enhancing control by citizens of decision-making which
affects them and overcoming disparities in the distribution of citizenship rights
and opportunities.”202
Marks’ approach is supported by Anghie, who notes that while his work
demonstrates the “imperial dimensions” of various initiatives, he is “not arguing that we
should dispense with the ideals that inform them … Rather, the attempt here is to contest
imperial versions of these ideals, and to seek their extension to all areas of the
international system.”203

Anghie continues: “As Susan Marks puts it, … ‘[w]hen ideals

begin to seem like illusions, we can jettison and replace them. Or we can reassert and
reclaim them’.”204
Rajagopal argues that as social movements adopt a cultural politics informed by
alternate conceptions of territory, autonomy, rights or identity, and alternate visions of
development, human rights discourse has been unable to recognise much social
movement resistance.205 This suggests that it is critically important that a regime of
home state regulation be structured so as to acknowledge the capacity of subaltern
communities to define their own vision of participation and development, rather than
imposing a predetermined view of participatory rights that may not reflect community
culture.206

The question is whether this vision is compatible with Marks.
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acknowledges that arguments are often raised in the human rights context suggesting that
proposed norms are not appropriate for the society concerned due to various cultural
considerations, such as the claim that the community is more important than the
individual, or duties are more important than rights, or economic prosperity is more
important than civic engagement.207 Yet Marks counters with the observation that culture
is a series of contested practices, with the central issue being the politics of any argument
based on culture in human rights discourse: one must always ask the status of the speaker,
in whose name the argument is advanced, and what degree of participation in culture
formation impacted social groups have.208 This suggests that Marks would support a
nuanced vision of democratic engagement that opens the door to local community views
as defined by local communities themselves, provided that the contested nature of cultural
politics is acknowledged and accounted for. Such a vision must then be incorporated into
any proposed home state regulatory regime.

Conclusions
A worthwhile contribution to counter-hegemonic globalisation, then, may be to
rethink the established legal doctrines of sovereign equality and non-interference guided
by Marks’ principle of democratic inclusion, in accordance with Rajagopal’s project of
writing resistance into international law. Crucially, this rethinking must be informed by
the insight that subaltern perspectives and experiences, such as those of local
communities impacted by global mining investment, are central not only to the content of
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the primary rules of international law, but also to the very structure of international legal
argument and the international legal form.

While the purpose of this article was

ostensibly to evaluate whether unilateral home state regulation could contribute to
customary international law process, the conclusion is that the answer to this question can
only be gleaned by taking into account the perspectives of subaltern local communities
themselves. This suggests that the legitimacy of unilateral home state regulation is likely
to be greater if the structure of the regulation gives voice to those communities. This is in
keeping with Marks’ principle of democratic inclusion, as well as Nancy Fraser’s “allaffected principle”, according to which “all those affected by a given social structure or
institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it.”209 Furthermore,
Fraser proposes that the “all-affected principle” should inform the “meta-political”
framing of justice, thus embracing “parity of participation” in the meta-discourses that
“determine the authoritative division of political space”.210
It is difficult to conceptualise how subaltern voices could participate in customary
international law process, or, as identified by Fraser, in the even more elusive framing of
customary international law process, at least if one accepts that customary international
law is a state-based regime designed by and for states.211 Brunnée and Toope’s proposal
for an interactional theory of international law based on the legal theory of Lon Fuller
209
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may offer some insights, however.212 For example, if customary international law is best
understood as “a process of persuasion, dependent upon shared perceptions of
legitimacy”, then a customary international law process that includes subaltern voices
among the social actors from which it seeks allegiance would have to recognise the
importance of subaltern perception’s of legitimacy.213
The structure of the FCPA described in the opening pages of this article, which in
turn led to multilateral agreement on anti-bribery and corruption matters, would likely
accord with subaltern perceptions of legitimacy. The legislation has been criticised as
imperialist by some scholars who claim that it imposes Western understandings of
bribery, disregarding the pluralist cultural meanings of gift-giving around the world.
However, as the legislation also provides an exemption for payments that are lawful
under host state law, it serves to ensure that host state officials who wish to receive
payments that might be viewed as bribes do so in a transparent manner, by passing
legislation to protect their actions. This increases the ability of local communities within
the host state to hold their government officials to account, should subaltern perspectives
on what qualifies as acceptable gift-giving not be reflected in host state legislation.
The HBA, on the other hand, while ostensibly about promoting democracy in
Cuba, had within it no provisions that would have enhanced the ability of local
communities within Cuba to express their views about democracy either to the
government of the United States, or to their own government. Instead, the legislation
212
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provided U.S. companies with an opportunity to recoup the cost of expropriated
investments, while attempting to pressure non-U.S. companies from investing in Cuba
now or in the future. This reflects U.S. foreign policy goals far more clearly than any
international policy goal relating to Cuban democracy that might find support from
Cuba’s subaltern.
In conclusion, this article reveals that home state regulation, if structured in light
of a principle of democratic inclusion, can be conceptualised as an example of
transnational governance informed by the counter-hegemonic project of reading subaltern
resistance into international law, rather than as an illegitimate if not imperialistic exercise
of unilateral jurisdiction. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make any concrete
proposals about the exact structure home state legislation should take in the human rights
and environment context. However, at a minimum, this analysis provides moral support
for the exercise of unilateral home state jurisdiction, which, if transformed into state
practice, would build support for the positive obligation to regulate under traditionally
conceived customary international legal process. Moreover, the analysis underscores the
need for a rethinking of the content of the primary rules of international environmental
and human rights law. While international environmental and human rights law does not
reveal a hard law obligation for home states to regulate TNCs in order to both prevent
and repair harm, there are clear signs that such norms are emerging.214 The emergence of
these norms becomes more evident if the reshaping of the principles of sovereign equality
and non-interference proposed in this article inform the assessment.
214

Seck, supra note 4; SRSG Report, supra note 1. The terminology used here suggests that emerging
norms can become hard law norms. However, as the theory of the legal form adopted here is not based
upon a coercive model, it is not necessary for a bright line to exist between emerging and hard law norms.
For a nuanced discussion of this issue in the context of their proposed interactional model of international
law, see Brunnée & Toope, supra note 198, especially at 67-69.
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